In the early 1980s, the United States led the world in manufacturing photovoltaic solar energy. Three prominent companies, Arco Solar, Shell Oil and Siemans Solar, installed systems on the roofs of homes and apartments in Hawaii and the world\u2019s first large-scale PV solar field in Paso Robles, California.<\/em>
\u00a0<\/em>
President Jimmy Carter even installed some on the roof of the White House.<\/em> However, in 1985, President Ronald Reagan eliminated government credits supporting the infant industry. He even removed the panels on the White House roof.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Short sighted? Perhaps or maybe it was just the current refrain, \u201cDrill Baby Drill\u201d?<\/em> Source: MPDI, https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/energies\/energies-15-<\/a>00306\/article_deploy\/html\/images\/energies-15-00306-g001.png Free Trade and Fair Trade<\/strong> Can the U.S. Alternate Energy Solar Panel Manufacturing Industry Compete? Photovoltaics – Converting Sunshine into Electrical EnergyIn the early 1980s, the United States led the world in manufacturing photovoltaic solar energy. Three prominent companies, Arco Solar, Shell Oil and Siemans Solar, installed systems on the roofs of homes and apartments in Hawaii and the world\u2019s […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":151,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"brizy-blank-template.php","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","iawp_total_views":4,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30,18,20,53],"tags":[70,43,67,66,68,69,71],"class_list":["post-147","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-critical-thinking","category-finance","category-in-the-news","category-international-business","tag-alternative-energy","tag-critical-thinking","tag-krugman","tag-porter","tag-pv-energy","tag-solar-energy","tag-tariffs"],"yoast_head":"\n
\u00a0<\/em>
This article briefly explores Dr. Michael Porter\u2019s reasoning for his 1990 publication, <\/em>The Competitive Advantage of Nations<\/em><\/a>, analyzing\u00a0fundamental\u00a0forces driving nations’ competitive advantages.<\/em>
\u00a0Porter\u00a0identified six key factors\u00a0contributing\u00a0to a country\u2019s current and future global competitiveness. We will review Porter\u2019s conclusions\u00a0in context with his updates to his original study\u00a0and\u00a0subsequent selected literature.<\/em>
\u00a0<\/em>
Dr. Paul Krugman won the Nobel Prize for his academic literature on Free Trade Theory, a new view of general Trade Theory. This article also includes a brief review of Dr. Krugman\u2019s New Trade Theory and thoughts on using Tariffs, often suggested by politicians to save U.S. industries and reduce imports.<\/em>
With the advent and acceleration of globalization in the past ten years, some studies suggest that Porter\u2019s assumptions and dynamics should be updated and modified. Although this article considers these points of view, it is beyond the scope to thoroughly analyze the body of literature and the validity of these arguments.\u00a0<\/em>
\u00a0<\/em>
This article\u2019s analysis aims\u00a0to review the relatively nascent United States alternative energy markets in today\u2019s global environment\u00a0and\u00a0compare and contrast these with the experiences of select countries.\u00a0<\/em>
Finally, the author proposes\u00a0specific\u00a0industry and trade policies to advance U.S. competitiveness in this emerging industry sector and reflects on their coherence with Porter, the economic literature and Free Trade.<\/em>
\u00a0
Keywords: Porter, Krugman, Competitive Nations, New Trade Theory, Alternative Energy, Solar Energy, Tariffs, Globalization, International Competition, Drill Baby Drill, China solar energy
\u00a0
Overview<\/strong>
Polysilicon is the base solar cell raw material, and\u00a0Wafers are sliced from manufactured polysilicon single cell czochralski\u00a0ingots.\u00a0Once processed with texturing baths and doped with implanted chemicals a Positive-Negative junction (a “P-N Junction”). PV\u00a0Cells\u00a0can now produce electricity when exposed to sunlight.\u00a0
\u00a0
A similar process occurs with amorphous photovoltaics. This is called amorphous silicon or a-SI. Silicon is converted to a chemical vapor and deposited as thin films on substrates such as glass or other flexible materials.
\u00a0
A-Si technology has better lower light absorption and a higher tolerance for temperature variations than crystalline silicon cells. Thinner layers can be used, reducing material and manufacturing costs. However, a-Si photovoltaics have lower efficiency in converting sunlight to electricity and less long-term stability over time than their crystalline counterparts. Crystalline silicon cells typically have 15% to 22% efficiency, while a-Si solar cells range only 6% to 10%.
Solar\u00a0panels are the final PV product.\u00a0\u00a0
\u00a0
While U.S. citizens continue to install solar panels supported by today’s government incentives, today’s United States\u2019 PV solar manufacturing is seriously behind since 1985 when Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) led the world and installed the first 5 megawatt solar installation in Paso Robles, California. Wood Mackenzie’s research recently predicted that China will hold 80% of the world\u2019s PV manufacturing, including both single-cell and amorphous photovoltaics.
\u00a0
Alternative Energy Industry Dynamics
<\/strong>The U.S. alternative energy markets today consist primarily of generating electricity by:
1. Converting water into steam to drive turbines (e.g., solar thermal and geothermal).
2. Converting sunlight into direct current electricity (e.g., photovoltaics).
3. Wind powered\u00a0turbines.
\u00a0
Alternative fuels (e.g., biofuels) and electric or hybrid electric-fuel vehicle engines are also typically included.\u00a0However, battery powered tools and autos such as the Tesla, are ways of storing and using electricity from any source, whether from traditional or alternative electricity sources.
\u00a0
If we take\u00a0but\u00a0one of these alternative energy sources, such as solar photovoltaics, we can demonstrate the dynamics operating within the U.S. and global alternative energy market. Consistent with Porter\u2019s (1990) allowance for dramatic changes affecting national\u00a0industries, the international 1973 oil crises sparked interest in alternative energy sources.
\u00a0
In an attempt to combat rising unemployment and inflation with stagnant business growth (sometimes termed \u201cstagflation\u201d ), the Carter administration (1977-1981) turned to increased government spending and deregulation of\u00a0specific\u00a0industries such as railroads, airlines and trucking.
\u00a0
In\u00a01977,\u00a0President Carter established green tax credits and corporate financial incentives to encourage America\u2019s move toward alternative energy.\u00a0In June 1979,\u00a0thirty-two solar thermal panels were installed\u00a0on\u00a0the White House roof. At the\u00a0dedication,\u00a0Carter said, \u201cA generation from now, this solar heater can either be a curiosity, a museum piece, an example of a road not taken, or it can be a small part of one of the greatest and most exciting adventures ever undertaken by the American people\u201d (as cited by Wihbey, 2008).
\u00a0
The incentives attracted large oil companies\u00a0such\u00a0as\u00a0U.S. based\u00a0Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) and the Dutch\u00a0multinational\u00a0oil\u00a0company,\u00a0Shell, to enter and grow the domestic U.S. solar photovoltaic (PV) market.\u00a0
\u00a0
The industries for innovative single\u00a0cell czochralski\u00a0crystal\u00a0silicon based\u00a0technology startups, research into advanced amorphous PV technologies, and improvements in deep cycle batteries to store the energy created rapidly grew. In 1982, ARCO Solar installed the first, large industrial\u00a05 megawatt\u00a0facility in California. Daily, 756 solar panels tracked the sun azimuth throughout the seasons from east to west.\u00a0
Small photovoltaic industry clusters began in\u00a0the\u00a0California-Arizona\u00a0area\u00a0and a few states on the east coast.
\u00a0
With a lagging economy and change of administrations in 1982, the Reagan administration\u2019s industrial and economic policies took the position that government was the problem, not the solution to the U.S. economic malaise.\u00a0Deregulation of industries continued, by\u00a01985\u00a0the green tax and financial incentives were allowed to expire, and – although a small contingent of firms survived \u2013 the U.S. photovoltaic alternative energy movement was effectively dead.\u00a0In\u00a01986,\u00a0the White House solar thermal panels were removed (Wihbey, 2008).\u00a0In 1988, interest in ARCO’s 5-megawatt \u00a0project waned, and\u00a0by\u00a01995,\u00a0all PV panels had been removed.\u00a0
\u00a0
What was missing, and why did this occur?
Reflecting on Porter\u2019s four\u00a0basic\u00a0forces driving\u00a0domestic competition, one was missing – Demand Conditions \u2013 the domestic market demand for an industry\u2019s products or services.
President Carter recognized a future need for alternative energy resources, but President Reagan looked to the demand for solar energy, and that market was in its infant stage. President Reagan allowed government policies (i.e., the tax incentives) for PV solar to expire, and companies such as ARCO no longer found it profitable on a combined financial basis, and it exited the industry with many others.
\u00a0
Other companies followed similar routes, either eliminating or curtailing future industry efforts.
Within the\u00a0last\u00a015\u00a0years,\u00a0there has been a revival in the search for alternative energy\u00a0sources, and\u00a0these industries are again growing, including the solar PV industry.\u00a0This\u00a0time, countries such as Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, and Japan led the\u00a0renaissance.\u00a0
\u00a0
Japan\u2019s PV market is highly competitive and\u00a0tends to be\u00a0mostly\u00a0for domestic\u00a0use with\u00a0some exports. Taiwan had entered the market, exporting 97% of all production and was ranked second in production capacity in 2011 (Su, 2013)
\u00a0
But China was not far behind!<\/strong>
\u00a0
China\u2019s\u00a0government-subsidized\u00a0investment in PV manufacturing facilities to achieve economies of scale in declared \u201cclustering\u201d regions of China including Jiangsu Province and Chengdu in Sichuan Province.
Figure 1 shows the world production capacity as of 2019.\u00a0This\u00a0has driven down global wafer and module prices shown in Figure 1, benefitting the industry\u2019s continued growth.
\u00a0
Figure 1 PV Manufacturing Comparison<\/strong>![\"\"](\"https:\/\/wrinkledworld.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/Chart-PV-Manufacturing-Comparisons.png\")
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Global PV Production Capacity continued to improve economies of scale, anticipating increasing investment returns from the PV cell and module export industry.
Figure 2 China’s PV Manufacturing<\/strong>![\"\"](\"https:\/\/wrinkledworld.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/Chart-PV-Manufacturing-Comparisons-7-countries.png\")
Figure 3 Global PV Production Capacity 2011-2019 <\/strong>
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/wrinkledworld.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/Chart-Global-Solar-Manufacturing.png\")
Source: Bloomberg NEF. Retrieved from https:\/\/pv-magazine-usa.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2021\/02\/vcsPRAsset_3487276_190133_e0c09902-1edc-4d80-bbb9-365b8aa3e9e5_0.jpg<\/a>
So what happened?
One could conclude that these trends demonstrate support for Porter\u2019s Diamond Model,
the positive effects of government subsidies and industry clustering, and
the benefits of U.S. innovation with China\u2019s implementation of those innovations.
One could also conclude that this supports both New Trade Theory and New Economic Geography.
Recent 2022 data suggests that these conclusions are correct; however, given fluctuations in the PV world market, there may be excess PV manufacturing capacity, and these current trends may not be sustainable.
The body of research literature and data support that a country\u2019s comparative advantage in innovations is not sustainable without a highly skilled, educated workforce and global protection of technological intellectual property. We see this and the power of \u201cclustering\u201d in the PV industry, especially in the advanced silicon chip industry, currently controlled by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). For more on this, read The Chips That Make Taiwan the Center of the World by Chris Miller in TIME Online (https:\/\/time.com\/6219318\/tsmc-taiwan-the-center-of-the-world\/<\/a> ).
Figure 4 China’s Share of World PV Manufacturing Supply Chain<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/wrinkledworld.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/China-Share-of-Global-Solar-Market.png\")
Source: https:\/\/www.bernreuter.com\/files\/data\/solar-industry\/value-chain\/china-production-share-in-solar-value-chain-2019.jpg<\/a>
\u00a0
New Trade Theory and Porter\u2019s Diamond Model in U.S. National Policy<\/strong>
In 1990\u00a0Michael\u00a0Porter published\u00a0The Competitive Advantage of Nations<\/em><\/a> (Porter, 1990<\/a>). This article briefly explores Porter\u2019s reasoning for his original publication analyzing\u00a0key\u00a0forces driving the competitive advantage of nations. Porter\u2019s conclusions\u00a0are reviewed\u00a0in context with updates from Porter and subsequent select literature.
\u00a0
Porter\u2019s study of over 100 industries in 10 countries constituted 50 percent of 1985 world exports.\u00a0Its premise is that nations \u2013 like companies and industries \u2013 compete in the world markets for their\u00a0own\u00a0nationalistic objectives\u00a0such\u00a0as growth in\u00a0gross\u00a0domestic product (GDP), the country\u2019s international attractiveness for foreign direct investments (FDI), natural and human resources (workforce and brain power), and\u00a0political- economic\u00a0influence.
\u00a0
Based on his study, Porter created the\u00a0Diamond Model<\/strong>, providing a construct for thinking about successful competition among nations. The essential premise of Porter\u2019s model is that a country\u2019s industries initially compete domestically and regionally\u00a0and the\u00a0pressures of this competition improve the industry\u2019s innovative nature, developing competitive advantages that\u00a0can then be extended\u00a0globally. It assumes the local, regional and national companies survive.
\u00a0
\u00a0
\u00a0
Figure 5 Porter\u2019s Diamond Model<\/strong>![\"\"](\"https:\/\/wrinkledworld.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/Porter-diamond-model-2.png\")
\u00a0
\u00a0
Porter\u00a0identified six key factors\u00a0contributing\u00a0to a country\u2019s current and future global competitiveness. With globalization arriving and accelerating in the past few years, some studies suggest that Porter\u2019s assumptions and dynamics should be updated and modified.\u00a0
\u00a0
Applying Porter\u2019s Diamond Model\u00a0and New Trade Theory to U.S. National Policy<\/strong>
\u00a0
Porter\u2019s Diamond Model Determinants<\/strong>
The study and resulting model (Porter, 1990)\u00a0were\u00a0based\u00a0on two parameters.\u00a0
\u00a0
First, as a proxy for national trade success, the study focused on each country\u2019s industries where domestic companies were internationally successful.\u00a0Success was primarily defined\u00a0as either or both
a) significant exports to a broad array of other\u00a0countries,\u00a0and
b) substantial investment of the firm\u2019s domestically developed skills and assets into foreign markets.
\u00a0
Each industry deemed \u201csuccessful\u201d was then analyzed in a snapshot of 1971, 1978, and 1985 performance. This information was analyzed and refined to derive relevant conclusions about competitive advantage.\u00a0
\u00a0
Secondly, the study (Porter, 1990) investigated over 100 key industries, the reason any one country\u2019s industry began, how\u00a0the industry\u00a0grew, and how they became internationally competitive. Finally, it reviewed how this competitive advantage was maintained or lost over time.\u00a0Contrasting the concepts of national comparative advantage, the study did not include industries dependent upon natural resources.
Porter\u2019s analyses (1990) conclude that\u00a0there are four\u00a0basic\u00a0forces driving\u00a0domestic competition:
1. Factor Conditions<\/strong> \u2013 the presence of\u00a0key\u00a0factors of production such as skilled labor, access to technology, or infrastructure;
2. Demand Conditions<\/strong> \u2013 the domestic market demand for an industry\u2019s products or services;
3. Related and Supporting Industries<\/strong> \u2013 domestically available supply and distribution chain industries or related industries that are internationally\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0competitive;\u00a0and
4. Firm Rivalry, Structure, and Strategies<\/strong> \u2013 those national policies governing business\u00a0and the\u00a0cultural organization and management of such\u00a0businesses.
\u00a0
Porter (1990) did not fail to recognize that both the role of chance and important disadvantages (e.g., a significant lack of\u00a0certain\u00a0national resources) are\u00a0two\u00a0critical\u00a0elements in success. Chance and Disadvantages constitute the fifth and sixth points of the diamond. Unfortunately, the options for\u00a0chance\u00a0are\u00a0extensive,\u00a0unpredictable,\u00a0and include anticipated surprises (such as\u00a0major\u00a0breakthrough inventions and technologies), a significant change in world demand, a shift in consumption preferences (business\u00a0and\/or\u00a0consumer), foreign political decisions, changes in government, dramatic changes in\u00a0the exchange\u00a0rate, sudden price shocks, regional or national wars, and unforeseen government failures (economic\u00a0and\/or\u00a0political).\u00a0
\u00a0
The study has been augmented over the past several years (Porter, 2001, 2008, 2012) and reviewed by a\u00a0large,\u00a0diverse body of academics and organizations.\u00a0Porter continues to maintain that the ability of a nation\u2019s industries to innovate and build on strategic assets are key\u00a0to sustainable success. Countries with significant disadvantages\u00a0are required to\u00a0innovate and upgrade skills and assets to compete. Japan has been such an example. With limited space and employees, Japan innovatively created just-in-time manufacturing and highly automated, flexible manufacturing lines.\u00a0Countries with an abundance of\u00a0a resource\u00a0such\u00a0as\u00a0low cost\u00a0labor in India and China, may deploy that asset quite inefficiently,\u00a0ultimately making it difficult for these industries to compete\u00a0long term\u00a0internationally.
\u00a0
Since 1990, increasing globalization (Friedman, 2006; Kynge, 2006) and disaggregation of the supply chain (Meredith, 2007)\u00a0bring\u00a0Porter\u2019s original constructs and conclusions into question.\u00a0
\u00a0
Global\u00a0multinational\u00a0companies appear to be able to divide and specialize endlessly to seek out the lowest cost\u00a0resources,\u00a0most\u00a0favorable business\u00a0climate,\u00a0and selectively upgrade their assets based on any one country\u2019s endowments.\u00a0One may conclude that these are\u00a0then\u00a0more like nationally autonomous\u00a0corporate-states\u00a0(as opposed to nation-states).\u00a0Porter (1990, 1991) suggested that these\u00a0multi-national\u00a0enterprises are strongly influenced by the home base.\u00a0He states, \u201ca firm\u00a0can only have one true home base for each distinct business or segment.\u201d (Porter, 1990, p. 606). Other studies, however, conclude that the largest, successful\u00a0multinationals\u2019\u00a0foreign strategic business units\u00a0are influenced\u00a0by each unique country environment in which they operate and modify their strategies accordingly (Rugman&Verbeke, 1993; Rugman, 2009; Hejazi, 2009).
\u00a0
Ryu and Simpson (2011) suggest that domestic competition of\u00a0multinationals\u00a0may hone the company\u2019s competitiveness within its domestic market, but\u00a0do\u00a0not necessarily translate to global competitiveness.\u00a0Reviewing three large\u00a0multinationals\u00a0\u2013 Wal-Mart (U.S.), Carrefour (France), and Tesco (Britain) \u2013 the authors identify three\u00a0key\u00a0elements for retailers operating in global (non-domestic) markets. For foreign markets, companies must:
1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Adapt to the foreign country\u2019s culture and market;
2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Attain competitive advantage in the domestic or regional foreign\u00a0market;\u00a0and
3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Balance corporate mindset to the global market and strategies.
\u00a0<\/strong>
Trade Theories<\/strong>
Ricardo\u2019s Trade Theory<\/strong> (Ricardo, 1817 as cited by Sraffa, 1951), has played a significant role when economists and governments consider a nation\u2019s comparative advantages and economic policies.\u00a0Traditional trade theory suggests that the\u00a0balance of trade\u00a0(e.g., value of imports versus exports for product manufacturing or services) will move to\u00a0those\u00a0countries with a comparative advantage \u2013 countries that do what they can\u00a0do\u00a0best.\u00a0A country that can provide internationally competitive products or services at the lowest labor cost (e.g., China and India) enhance that nation\u2019s ability\u00a0to then purchase\u00a0the higher value goods and services of foreign countries that require higher-level skills and resources (e.g., iPhones or laser weaponry).
\u00a0<\/strong>
Free trade theory<\/strong> considers this a positive sum game.\u00a0As an\u00a0example, when the U.S. is experiencing the\u00a0apparently\u00a0negative\u00a0domestic effects of outsourcing or competition from lower-cost\u00a0foreign\u00a0imports, trade theory asserts that some U.S. employment and GDP may initially be lost. The foreign country will gain U.S. market share and global market share.\u00a0However, the U.S. will enjoy lower-cost goods and as\u00a0the\u00a0foreign countries become\u00a0more successful, their demand\u00a0will increase\u00a0for high-value goods\u00a0that require U.S.\u00a0skilled labor and technologies.\u00a0In the long term, the U.S., therefore, will still see increasing domestic GDP and skilled job growth.
\u00a0
Trade theory remains tied to its roots of comparative advantage. However,\u00a0New Trade Theory (NTT), strategic trade theory (e.g., Krugman, 1994, 1991), and Porter\u2019s Diamond Model (Porter 1990, 1991) would also suggest that countries can improve their competitiveness.\u00a0Overall,\u00a0the literature indicates that free trade and globalization will eventually benefit all countries.\u00a0
\u00a0
Studies of other countries support this. In India\u00a0for\u00a0example, a recent study (Hasana, Mitrab, Ranjanc, &Ahsand, 2012) concludes that unemployment does not increase in Indian industries when trade protections are reduced, especially in cities and net export industries.\u00a0Recently,\u00a0however, Nobel laureate Dr. Paul Samuelson has questioned the perceived benefit to the U.S. (Samuelson, 2004). Discussed further below, he suggested that for the past fifty years, net win-lose have favored developing nations where \u201cimitative inventions\u201d (Samuelson, 2005, p. 243) are available.\u00a0 Furthermore, he posits a continual leveling of geographic economic differences and will continue to plague advanced nations for the next fifty years.
\u00a0
Dr. Paul Krugman,\u00a02008\u00a0Nobel laureate, contributed a body of work (e.g., Krugman, 1991) incorporating the rigor of a new mathematical model and updated trade theory regarding\u00a0both\u00a0returns to scale (constant, increasing or decreasing) and economic geography.\u00a0That\u00a0is,\u00a0that manufacturing\u00a0will occur in only a few sites due to efficiencies of economies of scale, and these sites will be near their markets.\u00a0
\u00a0
As another example, oil travels thousands of miles from multiple locations to accumulation sites before finally traveling to a few gasoline refineries with the required economies of scale close to its markets. Of course, changes in underlying costs (e.g., transportation cost from railroad infrastructure growth or digital delivery over the internet) or shifts in market demand may alter these geographic preferences.
\u00a0
New Trade Theory (NTT) and New Economic Geography (NEG) were
Krugman\u2019s\u00a0contribution. Both NTT and NEG continue to support free market trade concepts.
\u00a0
Samuelson (2004) created a\u00a0money-metric-utility to measure\u00a0the\u00a0actual gains and losses\u00a0of countries\u2019 industries.\u00a0It partially refuted NTT and suggested that for the past fifty years, net win-lose have favored developing nations where \u201cimitative inventions\u201d (Samuelson, 2005, p. 243) are available.\u00a0That is,\u00a0with today\u2019s interconnected global world and technology, net gains can now go to country economies where\u00a0low cost, educated people are available to business \u2013an imitative process rather than an innovative one.\u00a0 Furthermore, he posits a continual leveling of geographic economic differences and concludes that lose-win will continue to plague advanced nations for the next fifty years. Regarding claims in the literature that he favored protectionism, he later clarified\u00a0that,\u00a0\u201c\u2026leaving or compromising free trade policies will most likely reduce future growth in well-being in both the advanced and less productive regions of the world. Protectionism breeds monopoly, crony capitalism and sloth\u201d (Samuelson, 2005, p. 242).
\u00a0
Consistent with New Trade Theory, Krugman\u2019s study (1990)\u00a0there is an argument\u00a0for some government support of the nascent U.S. PV manufacturing industry.
Porter\u2019s Clustering
Porter\u2019s analyses of \u201cclustering\u201d (1990, 1990a, 2008, 2012) and the derived industry competitive advantage provide other advantages to nations. These views are generally consistent with Krugman\u2019s analysis (1991).\u00a0 Industries will tend to\u00a0locate\u00a0regionally but for different reasons (Furman, Porter, and Stern, 2002). Porter concludes that this regional and national clustering contributes to innovation (Furman, Porter, and Stern, 2002; Porter, 1990, 1990a, 2008, 2012).
\u00a0
Given the disruptive globalizing nature of new technology (e.g., global internet connectivity)\u00a0the\u00a0more recent off-shoring of\u00a0higher level\u00a0skilled U.S. white-collar jobs to India, China, and Taiwan may not be\u00a0good\u00a0for the U.S. long term (Samuelson, 2004, 2005).\u00a0\u00a0
India is accelerating influence in Information Technologies (IT), China in manufactured goods and Rare Earth production (e.g., Lithium), and Taiwan in the world\u2019s most used, sophisticated silicon chips.
\u00a0
In 2004, economist Robert Feenstra \u2013 a University of California, Davis trade\u00a0economist\u00a0said, “This is a whole unexplored question that is very controversial, and nobody has a clue about what the numbers are” (as cited by Bloomberg, 2004).
\u00a0
Strategic Industry Protection<\/strong>
Krugman (1991, 1994) concludes that NTT supports certain benefits for\u00a0the government\u00a0to intervene\u00a0in international trade. Krugman argues that although imperfect markets may lead to suboptimal results,\u00a0both\u00a0external economies (economies of scale found in\u00a0vertically\u00a0integrated production of intermediates that\u00a0are not traded) and oligopolies create distortions inconsistent with historical unfettered free trade theory.
\u00a0
Tariffs and non-tariff barriers may\u00a0be perceived\u00a0as protectionism, and to some\u00a0extent\u00a0they are just that. Protectionism is usually an effort to slow down or block global adjustments such as increasing unemployment by displacing labor, production geographic relocations, or changing product requirements.
\u00a0
The\u00a0global\u00a0balance for efficiencies in the free market\u00a0is sacrificed\u00a0\u2013 at least\u00a0in the short\u00a0term \u2013 for the business industry economy, employment and higher wages. Studies conclude (e.g., Krugman 1994, Dixit, 1998; Baldwin and Krugman, 1988) that limited tariffs do not significantly affect free trade and, in fact,\u00a0may improve domestic market entry,\u00a0competition ,\u00a0exports and social welfare. Figure 6 represents the percent of non-tariff market barriers to entry for eleven developing\u00a0countries
\u00a0
Figure 6\u00a0\u00a0 Import Non-Tariff Barriers to Entry
<\/strong>![\"\"](\"https:\/\/wrinkledworld.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/WTO-Non-Tariff-barriers.png\")
\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>
\u00a0
Large, developed countries with robust trade economies can \u2013 and do – use such barriers to protect domestic markets, especially with smaller trade partners.\u00a0Many of these can\u00a0be seen\u00a0between large developed geographies\u00a0as well\u00a0(e.g., the U.S., China, Brazil, India, and the EU).\u00a0An additional non-tariff policy could include\u00a0specific\u00a0trade exchange policies of disparate products where there is mutual benefit to both trading partners; essentially, \u2018I will buy those of your country\u2019s production if you will buy these products of mine.\u2019\u00a0
\u00a0
I posit that\u00a0both tariffs and non-tariff policies should be used\u00a0to protect nascent U.S. industry or a strategically important industry such as advanced silicon chip manufacturing; however, these should be reduced or withdrawn over time to\u00a0assure the\u00a0domestic companies do not rely on such protection long term, but rather\u00a0continue to innovate to compete in both the domestic market and global free trade markets.
\u00a0
Clustering and Innovation Benefits
Porter (2008) concludes that geographical and regional clusters improve products and efficiencies, enable innovation, and facilitate\u00a0the formation\u00a0of new businesses and commercialization of new technologies.
\u00a0
When a national environment permits and supports the most rapid accumulation the most rapid accumulation of specialized skills and assets\u2026affords better ongoing information and insight[s]\u2026[and] pressures companies to innovate and invest,\u00a0 companies both gain a competitive advantage and upgrade those advantages over time. (Porter, 1990a, p. 79)
\u00a0
The PV industry, as discussed here, is primarily single crystal wafer-based.\u00a0It is exposed to change along many of the lines\u00a0discussed\u00a0by\u00a0Porter (1990).\u00a0New technologies in amorphous silicon exist, however\u00a0to date,\u00a0are\u00a0not currently effective in the market due to both a lack of solar efficiency per square meter and no significant midstream or downstream cost advantages.\u00a0As this technology, the DC to AC conversion costs, and electrical storage costs improve, all PV manufacturers may need to innovate to survive long term.
\u00a0
Therefore, the U.S. can encourage clustering and derive the inherent benefits by creating defined \u2018cluster zones\u2019 at or near existing U.S. PV or\u00a0silicon related\u00a0technology clusters.\u00a0Naturally occurring incentives\u00a0including\u00a0access to educated\u00a0workers\u00a0could be enhanced by government subsidies such as reduced taxation and export expense, employment credits, reduced green-field costs, or enhanced access to financial capital.\u00a0
\u00a0
Sophisticated Domestic Demand<\/strong>
Porter’s\u00a0diamond model indicates that sophisticated domestic market demand is vital\u00a0to create pressure for companies to continue to innovate and become\/remain globally competitive.\u00a0By creating market incentives such as purchase or energy tax credits, a return to buy American campaigns\u00a0and\/or\u00a0incentives,\u00a0access\u00a0to inexpensive financing and installation,\u00a0the U.S\u00a0commercial and private consumption should continue to grow, and these consumers should exhibit\u00a0normal\u00a0market forces when an industry has increased consumer power and influence.\u00a0That is,\u00a0growing\u00a0demands in quality, performance, features, and price control.
\u00a0<\/strong>
Endowments<\/strong>
In 2012, Porter reframed competitiveness into three factions:
1.Microeconomic\u00a0competitiveness<\/strong> – the nation\u2019s business climate, state of cluster development, and quality of companies\u2019 operations and strategies;
2. Macroeconomic\u00a0competitiveness<\/strong>–\u00a0 national economic policies and a country\u2019s development of human assets and political institutions
3. Endowments<\/strong> \u2013 a country\u2019s unique strategic national assets (e.g., human or financial capital) and\u00a0their effective use.
\u00a0
Other than\u00a0specific\u00a0tangible endowments\u00a0such\u00a0as transportation infrastructure, the U.S. has a comparative advantage in\u00a0certain\u00a0intangible endowments – our skilled workforce and higher education system. To enhance and maintain this advantage, I posit additional investments in both.\u00a0This\u00a0includes changes to\u00a0local, state or institutional policies. For example:
\u00b7Enhanced access to higher education\u00a0including\u00a0low\/no-cost financing for higher education for students from the U.S. and abroad; and improvements in U.S. internet infrastructure to increase distance learning by quality institutions for geographically remote students.
\u00b7Increased incentives for U.S. and\u00a0foreign students\u00a0to contribute to study for targeted\u00a0industry applicable\u00a0degrees (e.g., science, engineering, alternative energy); access for those students to find employment in targeted industries through student and employer incentives; and the ability to retain U.S. trained students in U.S. industries.\u00a0
\u00b7Incentives to retain an educated workforce.\u00a0For example, similar to U.S. military academies, a degree from a U.S. institution would require the student\u00a0\u2013\u00a0foreign or domestic\u00a0\u2013\u00a0to\u00a0live and work within the U.S. for a given period depending on the level of education. Incentives for foreign students to remain working in the U.S. or starting a\u00a0U.S based\u00a0business could include extended visa and work privileges.\u00a0
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although there is strong support for free trade within the body of literature, the current data does not necessarily reflect a level playing field. This may be due to government interventions, political and economic policies, or a plethora of reasons outside the boundaries of this review.
Upstream manufacturers of silicon or wafers provide a small portion of the overall $150 billion PV market. It has become a commodity and difficult for producers to differentiate. Economies of scale are important , but margins are lower. As Figure 7 also shows, China\u2019s dominance and economies of scale reflect overall lower PV cell and panel costs in this market sector.
Figure 7 Solar PV Cost Trends with Economies of Scale<\/strong>![\"\"](\"https:\/\/wrinkledworld.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/Solar-Manufacturing-Cost-Trend.png\")
Manufacturers of solar cells and panels also benefit from the economies of scale. In this sector, the U.S. has net negative exports to China (i.e., net imports exceed net exports). The downstream assembly of PV panels and installation of systems constitute the largest market share. Since installation is confined to a local or regional service, only panel manufacturing can be global, although assembly could be distributed regionally, locating nearest key markets to reduce transportation costs. If one views the U.S. assembly and installation maps, this is readily apparent.
Figure 8 U.S. Solar Installation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/wrinkledworld.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/Chart-US-Solar-PV-locations.png\")
Source: USPVDB Dynamic Database. Retrieved from https:\/\/eerscmap.usgs.gov\/uspvdb\/viewer\/#3\/37.11\/-93.44<\/a>
\u00a0
If one assumes that each country\u2019s national interests will drive economic and industrial policies (Gomory & Baumal, 2000), then free market dynamics will probably not stabilize.\u00a0\u00a0For example, in\u00a02012\u00a0the Obama administration applied a 31% import tariff on China wafers and panels to help the nascent\u00a0U.S. based\u00a0suppliers (Lee, 2012).\u00a0 In an apparent effort to provide indirect government subsidies to support
\u00a0
As China\u2019s excess wafer and panel capacity as world PV market demand weakened, China\u2019s domestic market consumed 20% of global PV shipments in 2012 (Marketbuzz, 2013).\u00a0One third\u00a0was in the last quarter of 2012\u00a0outstripping\u00a0all other countries (Marketbuzz, 2013).\u00a0 Both import tariffs\u00a0and government\u00a0subsidies to industries are inconsistent
\u00a0
Based on available data, World PV Market 2009 \u2013 2022<\/strong> with Porter (1990, 1990a, 2008) and trade theory (Baldwin &Krugman, 1988; Krugman, 1991,1994). Porter\u2019s (1990) diamond model and Krugman\u2019s (1991) New Trade Theory both suggest that \u201cchange,\u201d including disruptive political policies or other events, can significantly affect the balance for a stable, efficient free trade market.\u00a0
\u00a0
Although the overall PV market\u00a0is projected\u00a0to grow by 400 to 600 gigawatts (GW) from a 2012 installation base of only 65 GW, costs\u00a0are projected\u00a0to\u00a0continue to drop by as much as 10% per year through 2020.\u00a0PV prices tend to be set by fossil fuel prices,\u00a0therefore margins should continue to grow\u00a0for PV\u00a0(Aanesen, Heck, and Pinner, 2012).\u00a0The U.S. PV industry must survive during market and economic downturns to remain sustainable. Therefore, in\u00a0economic\u00a0and market downturns,\u00a0government interventions may again be required\u00a0both\u00a0here and abroad.\u00a0
\u00a0
Summary\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0
The last two parameters of\u00a0Porter’s\u00a0diamond model (Porter, 1990) are critical for the U.S. to sustain\u00a0long term\u00a0success in the global PV market.\u00a0Change – dramatic political, market, technological, or other events \u2013 is one of these.\u00a0Another is any major U.S. PV and chip making industries\u2019 disadvantage, such as disruptions in a consistent supply of rare earth resources (i.e., China currently controls 96% of the world supply), a critical processing component required in most silicon based technologies, including PV cell production.
\u00a0
Specifically, I would posit the following five U.S. strategic trade policies for the PV Alternative Energy industry which may apply to other emerging technologies:
\u00a0<\/strong>
1. Strategic Industry Protection<\/strong>
a. Provide limited tariff and non-tariff protection<\/strong>
b. Provide a plan to reduce or eliminate protection<\/strong>
2. Clustering and Innovation Benefits<\/strong>
a. Create regional PV cluster zones<\/strong>
b. Provide cash and non-cash incentives in PV cluster zones<\/strong>
3. Sophisticated Domestic Demand\u00a0<\/strong>
a. Enhance U.S. market incentives<\/strong>
b. Create alternative energy requirements<\/strong>
4. Secure and invest in Endowments (strategic assets)<\/strong>
a. Invest in Education\u00a0<\/strong>
b. Policies to retain educated human resources
5. Support free trade\u00a0concepts,\u00a0but work to enforce fair trade
\u00a0
The U.S. should continue to support free\u00a0trade,\u00a0but develop a fair trade policy and require compliance from trade partners \u2013 transparency, labor and environmental standards, dumping restrictions, and compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines.\u00a0This\u00a0may include reciprocity with mutual access to each trading partner\u2019s domestic markets – which may not always be in the best interests of one or either country. The question becomes, who determines what is fair? Global institutions like the WTO or International Monetary Fund may help\u00a0but\u00a0with limited enforceable authority.
\u00a0
This article proposes strategic trade policies for the U.S.; however, Porter warned in 1990,
\u00a0
\u2026there is a growing tendency to experiment with various policies intended to promote national competitiveness \u2013 from efforts to manage exchange rates to new measures to manage trade\u2026which usually end up\u00a0undermining it only. These new approaches\u2026are flawed. They fundamentally misperceive the\u00a0true\u00a0sources of competitive advantage. Pursuing them, with all their short-term appeal, will virtually guarantee that the United States\u2026never achieves\u00a0real\u00a0and sustainable advantage.<\/strong>
\u00a0
Within the last few years, the U.S. has again established tax credits and subsidized enhanced financing available to commercial and private PV consumers.\u00a0This\u00a0is partially a stimulus response to the weak U.S.\u00a0economy,\u00a0and\u00a0under\u00a0the Obama administration\u00a0a\u00a0way to encourage the domestic alternative energy industry.\u00a0These are\u00a0not permanent\u00a0policies, and how long they will last or remain effective is at question.\u00a0
\u00a0
As of 2010, the Carter White House thermal solar panels were in museums.\u00a0One is in the Smithsonian, one in the Carter Library, and one in the Solar Science and Technology Museum\u00a0in China.\u00a0After thirty years, the\u00a0U.S.\u00a0is re-engaging for comparative advantage in PV. PV solar panels are again \u201csprouting on the Carrizo\u201d (Sneed, 2012, p.1) in California,\u00a0employing\u00a0400 installers and eventually producing 800 megawatts (Sneed, 2012).\u00a0
\u00a0
With the U.S.\u00a0success in natural gas fractionation and the current U.S. dominance in oil production, the U.S. consumer and political interests in alternative energy sources may again wane. An analysis of this effect is well beyond the scope of this article. Only time and implementing new policies can defend or contradict the effective use of strategic trade theory.
\u00a0<\/strong>
References for further in-depth research and reading
Aanesen, K., Heck, S. & Pinner, D. (2012). Solar Power: Darkest before the dawn.\u00a0McKinsey on Sustainability & Resource Productivity<\/em>.Spring 2012.
\u00a0
Baldwin, R. &Krugman, P. 1988. Industrial Policy and International Competition\u00a0
in\u00a0Wide-bodied Jet Aircraft.\u00a0Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis<\/em>, R. Baldwin (Ed). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
\u00a0
Bloomberg.( 2004). Shaking Up Trade Theory.\u00a0Bloomberg Business Week Magazine.<\/em> Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/www.businessweek.com\/stories\/2004-12-05\/shaking-up-trade-theory<\/a>
\u00a0
Bloomberg. (2005). Online Extra: The Trade Challenge.\u00a0Bloomberg Business Week Magazine<\/em>. Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/www.businessweek.com\/stories\/2005-08-21\/online-extra-the-trade-challenge<\/a>
\u00a0
Chadly, A.\u00a0a, Moawad, K.\u00a0b,\u00a0 Salah, K.c,\u00a0 Omar, M.b,\u00a0Mayyas, A..(2012) WTO (2012).World Trade Report 2012.World Trade Organization, State of global solar energy market: Overview, China’s role, Challenges, and Opportunities Retrieved from Science Direct https:\/\/www.sciencedirect.com\/science\/article\/pii\/S2772737824000208<\/a>, Specifically, from\u00a0http:\/\/www.wto.org\/english\/res_e\/booksp_e\/anrep_e\/world_trade_report12_e.pdf<\/a>
\u00a0
Davies, H. & Ellis, P. (2000). Porter\u2019s Competitive Advantage of Nations: Time for the final\u00a0judgement?\u00a0Journal of Management Studies,37 (8),\u00a0<\/em>1189 \u2013 1213.
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Dixit, A. (1988). Optimal trade and industrial policies for the US automobile industry.Empirical Research in International Trade<\/em>, R. Feenstra (Ed.). Cambridge: MIT Press
Friedman, T. (2006).The\u00a0World is Flat: The globalized world in the twenty-first century.<\/em> London, Penguin Books Ltd.
\u00a0
Furman, J., Porter, M., & Stern, S. (2002). The Determinants of National Innovative Capacity.Research Policy,31<\/em>, 899-933. Retrieved from\u00a0www.elsevier.com\/locate\/econbase<\/a>.
\u00a0
Gomory, R. &Baumol, W. (2000).Global\u00a0Trade and Conflicting National Interests.The Quarterly Journal of Australian Economics,\u00a0<\/em> 10 (2): 83-92. Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/mises.org\/journals\/qjae\/pdf\/qjae10_2_6.pdf<\/a>
Grant, R. (1991). Porter\u2019s \u2018Competitive Advantage of Nations\u2019: An assessment.\u00a0Strategic Management Journal, 12,\u00a0<\/em>535-548.
\u00a0
Hachigian, N. &Sutphen, M. (2008).\u00a0Strategic Collaboration:\u00a0How the United States Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise.\u00a0The Washington Quarterly,\u00a0<\/em>31 (4), 43-57.
\u00a0
Hasana, R., Mitrab, D.\u00a0Ranjanc, P., &Ahsand, R. (2012). Trade liberalization and unemployment: Theory and evidence from India.\u00a0Journal of Development Economics<\/em>, 97 (2), 269-280.\u00a0Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/www.sciencedirect.com.catalog.georgefox.edu\/science\/article\/pii\/S0304387811000332<\/a>
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Hejazi, W. (2009). Does China Receive More Regional FDI than Gravity Would Suggest?\u00a0European Management Journal<\/em>,\u00a027<\/em>, 327-335. Retrieved from\u00a0www.elsevier.com\/locate\/emj<\/a>
\u00a0
Kaftan, C. (2013).US Leads China in Solar Exports.PV Magazine<\/em>, March 7, 2013. Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/www.pv-magazine.com\/news\/details\/beitrag\/us-leads-china-in-solar-exports_100010480\/#axzz2PTX4JSgx<\/a>
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Krugman, P. (1994) Introduction to Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. In P. Krugman (Ed.) & A. Smith (Ed.)\u00a0Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy.<\/em> pp. 1-10. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/www.nber.org\/chapters\/c8673.pdfhttp:\/\/www.nber.org\/chapters\/c8673.pdf<\/a>
\u00a0
Krugman, P. (1991). Increasing Returns and Economic Geography.Journal of Political Economy<\/em>, 99,(3), Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/discover\/10.2307\/2937739?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102065140827<\/a>
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Krugman, P. (2008). The Conscience of a Liberal.The New York Times,<\/em>Th\u00a0Opinion Pages, October 15.
Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/krugman.blogs.nytimes.com\/2008\/10\/15\/about-the-work\/<\/a>
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Kynge, J. (2006).\u00a0China Shakes the World: A\u00a0titan\u2019s\u00a0rise\u00a0and\u00a0troubled future\u00a0– and\u00a0thechallenge\u00a0for America<\/em>. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company
Lee, D. (2012). U.S. Orders Tariffs on Chinese Solar Panels.\u00a0Los Angeles Times<\/em>, May 18, 2012. Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/articles.latimes.com\/2012\/may\/18\/business\/la-fi-china-solar-dumping-20120518<\/a>
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Meredith, R. (2007).\u00a0The Elephant and the Dragon<\/em>. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
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Porter, M. (1986).Changing Patterns of International Competition.California Management Review<\/em>,\u00a0XXVIII, (2)<\/em>
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Porter, M. (1990).The Competitive Advantage of Nations.<\/em> New York: Free Press
Porter, M. (1990a). The Competitive Advantage of Nations.Harvard Business Review<\/em>. March-April 1990, pp. 73-91.\u00a0
\u00a0
Porter, M. & Millar, V. (2001). How Information Gives You Competitive Advantage.\u00a0Harvard Business Review,<\/em> July-August, 149-174.
\u00a0
Porter, M. (2008). Clusters, Innovation, and Competitiveness: New findings and implications for policy. Presentation in Stockholm, Sweden, January 22, 2008.Retrieved from\u00a0www.isc.hbs.edu<\/a>
\u00a0
Porter, M. (2012).Regional Competitiveness and the Role of Business.Presentation in Sintonia, Puebla, Mexico, April 27, 2012. Retrieved from\u00a0www.isc.hbs.edu<\/a>
\u00a0
Porter, M. (n.d.).Competition and Economic Development.(n.d,). Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness. M. Porter (ed.). Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/www.isc.hbs.edu\/econ-natlcomp.htm<\/a>
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Rugman, A. &Verbeke, A. (1993). Foreign Subsidiaries and\u00a0Multinational\u00a0Strategic Management: An extension and correction of Porter\u2019s diamond framework.\u00a0Management International Review, 33<\/em>, 71-84.
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Rugman, A. (2009). Is International Business Strategy Global or Regional?\u00a0European Management Journal, 27,\u00a0<\/em>293-294. Retrieved from\u00a0www.elsevier.com\/locate\/emj<\/a>
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\u00a0
Sneed, D. (2012). Solar Panels Sprouting on the Carizzo.The\u00a0Tribune<\/em>, February 4, 2012. Retrieved from\u00a0http:\/\/www.sanluisobispo.com\/2012\/02\/04\/1935825\/solar-panels-carrizo-plains.html<\/a>
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\u00a0
Wood McKenzie online (07 November 2023) China to hold over 80% of global solar manufacturing capacity from 2023-26. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.woodmac.com\/press-releases\/china-dominance-on-global-solar-supply-chain\/<\/a>
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\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n
![https:\/\/pv-magazine-usa.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2021\/02\/vcsPRAsset_3487276_190133_e0c09902-1edc-4d80-bbb9-365b8aa3e9e5_0.jpg<\/a> So what happened? One could conclude that these trends demonstrate support for Porter\u2019s Diamond Model,the positive effects of government subsidies and industry clustering, andthe benefits of U.S. innovation with China\u2019s implementation of those innovations. One could also conclude that this supports both New Trade Theory and New Economic Geography. Recent 2022 data suggests that these conclusions are correct; however, given fluctuations in the PV world market, there may be excess PV manufacturing capacity, and these current trends may not be sustainable. The body of research literature and data support that a country\u2019s comparative advantage in innovations is not sustainable without a highly skilled, educated workforce and global protection of technological intellectual property. We see this and the power of \u201cclustering\u201d in the PV industry, especially in the advanced silicon chip industry, currently controlled by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). For more on this, read The Chips That Make Taiwan the Center of the World by Chris Miller in TIME Online (](\"https:\/\/pv-magazine-usa.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2021\/02\/vcsPRAsset_3487276_190133_e0c09902-1edc-4d80-bbb9-365b8aa3e9e5_0.jpg\"){kind=link}